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Dynamic Contract With Uncertainty 
Wei Zhao 
Summary 
     In this paper I am going to study the incentive scheme between a principal 
and an agent in a dynamic setting and trying to deal with the case where 
there is an outcome-related uncertainty and the agent updates his belief in 
each round if he exerts effort. I assume that the belief-updating rule accords 
to the Bayesian, which is mutual knowledge between the principal and the 
agent. The principal can only make an inference on the agent’s belief based 
on the initial belief and the outcome in each round. Hence belief-discrepancy 
gain should be taken into account in the moral hazard issue.  
 
At first I study the two-stage model and I have derived the explicit form of 
the optimal contract, in which there is an equivalence between back-loading 
bonus, front-loading bonus and superior state fixed wage where the back-
loading bonus and superior state fixed wage are used to create cross-state 
incentive to balance the cost and the belief-discrepancy gain. And fixed wage 
at the other states are strictly dominated and therefore always set to zero. 
 
Secondly, I investigate the infinite-stage model with five states, two of which 
play the roles of extremal states. First I have shown the dominance of bonus 
over fixed wage, regardless of the discount factor and initial belief. This is due 
to the fact that even though bonus will increase the belief-discrepancy gain, 
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which deteriorates incentive in each round, such gain will be limited due to 
the assumed Bayesian belief updating rule and will be strictly dominated by 
its advantage in creating incentive. Second I prove that the Incentive 
Constraint (IC) will be binding in the optimum. This is because of the zig-zag 
property and time-persistence of belief-distortion effect. 
 
Finally, I study the infinite-stage model without extremal states. I have shown 
that at optimum IC binds at each state and I have also derived the explicit 
functional form of the minimum cost function. I have shown a way to solve 









Consider scenarios where the agent accumulates experience and learns in 
the process in which he has exerted effort. And such scenarios are quite rife 
in daily life. For instance, consider a mechanism design in which the professor 
would like to use the test (mechanism) to incentivize the student to exert 
effort at each semester. However, the student may be uncertain of his own 
ability and only during the process in which he has exerted effort can he gain 
a clearer image of his own ability. Or the student may have no idea of the 
professor’s grading or testing preference. And the student can learn it only if 
he tries his best to prepare for the exam. Finally, as is known students care 
about not only their own grades but also their ranking among class. However, 
the students may be uncertain of their fellow classmates’ abilities and they 
can only learn more of their classmates’ abilities if they have exerted effort in 
studying and preparation for the examination. Similar scenarios can also be 
found between employer and employee and the employee may have no 
knowledge of his own abilities, his teammates’ abilities, and the difficulties of 
a series of evaluation of performance and the employer’s evaluating 
preference. And more experience or more knowledge about the 
uncertainties listed above can be accumulated only if the employee has 
exerted effort or made a good preparation for the evaluation system. My 
paper is trying to deal with these issues where the uncertainty is on the agent 
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side and the agent updates his belief during the process in which he has 
exerted effort. 
 
Consider a scenario where the agent is uncertain of the outcome-related 
state and therefore he will learn more of the state during the process in 
which he exerts effort. He may become more confident or more optimistic 
toward the probability of success if he exerts effort, which makes it easier for 
the principal to incentivize the agent to exert effort. Or he may be more 
pessimistic and hence it is more difficult for the principal to incentivize the 
agent to exert effort.  The principal should coordinate incentive at each 
period to incentivize the agent to always exert effort. In this paper I 
investigate this question in a dynamic principal-agent setting. At each date 
the agent takes hidden action that has time persistent effects on firm’s 
performance. There are two actions: work or shirk. If the agent chooses work 
by paying a fixed cost, given his initial belief, then he not only realizes high 
expected payoff to the firm but also updates his belief contingent on the 
outcome at that period. And if the agent shirks at that period, his belief will 
be retained at next period. I then study the optimal contract that always 
induces the agent to choose work at each period.  
 
Since the principal does not observe the agent’s effort, but observes the 
outcome at prior rounds, if the agent shirks at some period, then there is a 
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belief discrepancy1 in the sense that the principal’s belief about the true state 
of the world will be updated based on outcomes at prior rounds while the 
agent’s belief will hold as he doesn’t exert effort and such belief discrepancy 
gain should be taken into account when dealing with moral hazard issue. And 
this belief discrepancy gain will weaken the role of bonus to some degree and 
makes the comparison between fixed wage and bonus more interesting. 
Time persistency also leads to the comparison between front-loading bonus 
and back-loading bonus.  
 
I have considered three scenarios: two-stage model, infinite-stage model 
with extremal states and infinite-stage model without extremal states. In the 
first scenario, I have explicitly characterized the optimal contract, in which 
there is an equivalence between the front-loading scheme and the back-
loading one, which means that it makes no difference for the principal to use 
high bonus if the agent is less confident and then use lower bonus once the 
agent becomes more confident or to use higher bonus at state where the 
agent is more confident. The back-loading bonus induces the agent to exert 
effort at state where he is pessimistic as the agent realizes that his action has 
time persistent effort and his effort at current period makes it easier for him 
to get the high back-loading bonus. And therefore back-loading bonus plays 
the role of cross-state incentive, which can also be played by fixed wage at 
higher state. The equivalence between back-loading bonus and fixed wage at 
                                                     
1 Here belief discrepancy refers to the discrepancy between the agent’s real belief and the principal’s 
inference of the agent’s belief. 
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higher state is also shown in this model. However fixed wage at other states 
is strictly dominated and therefore set to zero. In the second scenario I have 
shown the dominance of the bonus over the fixed wage. As I have mentioned 
bonus may lead to belief-discrepancy gain, which deteriorates the agent’s 
incentive to exert effort. However, such gain is limited as I have assumed that 
the belief updating rule accords to the Bayesian rule. And the dominance of 
bonus over fixed wage still holds. Moreover, I have also shown that at 
optimum IC holds. This is due to the time-persistent effect of belief 
distortion, which avoids over back-loading, and zig-zag property, which 
excludes over front-loading. In the third scenario, I have derived the explicit 
functional form of the minimum cost function and shown that at optimum 
the IC holds at each state. Finally, I have given a way to solve this question 
explicitly, which will be left as future work.  
 
This paper also contributes to the small literature on persistent moral hazard. 
Fernandes and Phelan (2000) provide a recursive approach to derive the 
optimal contract with repeated moral hazard issue and time persistent effort. 
Jarque (2010) considers a special class of repeated moral hazard problem 
with time persistent effort and shows that the optimal contract of this class 
of repeated moral hazard problem can be achieved by the optimal contract 
of the traditional repeated moral hazard problem. Sannikov (2014) also 
considers a continuous version of repeated moral hazard problem with time 
persistent effort. He studies two cases: a large firm case in which noise goes 
to infinity and cost of effort goes to zero at comparable rates, and the 
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exponential lagged effects case. Zhu (2015) considers a myopic agency model 
in which short-run action will jeopardize firms’ expected profit in the next 
period. In his model, the optimal contract can be characterized as back-
loading bonus and cliff-like arrangement. However, there are some 
differences between my model and other models. The most significant one of 
which is that while in their models, time persistence is modeled or assumed 
exogenously while in my model such effect is imposed through belief 
updating process. 
 
My paper, to some degree, can be related to the strand of literature on 
dynamic contract with reputation concerns. For instance, MacLeod and 
Malcomson (1988) studies a dynamic labor contract with learning where 
there is a hierarchy of workers in terms of abilities and the employer 
gradually learns their ability and choose to promote the well-abled 
employees while firing the less-abled ones. In their model there is a 
continuum of abilities and ability ranks are partitions on the continuum. Also 
perfect observability of worker’s effort is assumed and a restrictive 
assumption of belief updating is imposed. Yang (2009) and Hu (2015) 
consider a repeated moral hazard problem with incomplete information in 
the type of agent where inept agent could only choose low effort and 
competent agent could choose both high effort with higher cost and low 
effort with lower cost. An essential difference between my paper and this 
literature lies in that my paper assumes that it is the agent himself rather 
than the principle who doesn’t know its own type or put it in other way who 
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doesn’t know the principle’s type. And such incomplete information matters 
since it is the agent’s belief rather than the principle’s belief that determines 
the current incentive level. 
 
When it comes to the comparison between back-loading bonus and front 
loading bonus, both Zhu (2015) and Hu (2015) favor the back-loading bonus. 
Specifically, Zhu (2015) assumes that myopic action will decrease the 
expected profit of the firm in the next period though it exaggerates the firm’s 
profit in the current period. Back-loading bonus and cliff-like payoff scheme 
are then able to avoid the agent’s tendency in choosing myopic action. 
Besides back-loading bonus is also adopted in Hu (2015) who assumes that 
competent type agent’s effort is time persistent in terms of increasing the 
principal’s belief of the agent’s being competent. Back-loading bonus will 
help the principal not only not waste any incentive scheme in incentivizing 
the inept agent but also create cross-state incentive in incentivizing 
competent agent to exert effort in prior periods. In my paper, on the other 
hand, excessive front-loading bonus will contribute to belief-discrepancy gain 
in future states, especially in the next state, while excessive back-loading 
bonus contribute to belief-discrepancy gain in prior periods due to time-
persistent effect of belief distortion. And therefore such comparison is of 
interest. While in other’s paper, including Zhu (2015) and Hu (2015), fixed 
wage is not adopted simply because bonus not only provides intertemporal 
incentive, which is the only role played by the fixed wage, but also provides 
incentive within that period. However, in my paper bonus on the other hand 
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contributes to the belief-discrepancy gain, which deteriorates the agent’s 
incentive, especially in the next period. However, such dominance still holds 
in my model since such effect is limited due to assumption on the belief-
updating process.  
 
The final paper, which is closest to mine, is Ely (2015), which assumes that 
the principle observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends 
message to the agent each period truthfully. And the agent makes decision at 
each period based on his belief of the random variable at that moment which 
is updated from his initial belief by the message sent by the principal. The 
principle wishes to influence the agent actions. And the author has 
characterized the optimal mechanism. There are several differences between 
my paper and Ely (2015). The evolution of a stochastic process is given 
exogenously in Ely (2015) while it is given endogenously in my setting in the 
sense that the agent’s belief of the state evolves through the agent’s actions 
at each period. Secondly Ely (2015) assumes that the principal learns the 
state of the world perfectly while in my setting it makes no difference 
whether the principal knows or doesn’t know the true state of the world 
since I have assumed that it’s always optimal for the principal to incentivize 
the agent to exert effort at each period and it is the agent’s belief that 
determines the incentive level within that period. Finally, the principal could 
only influence the agent’s action through truthfully unveiling message while 
my paper assumes that the principal influences the agent’s action through 
bonus and wage. And I would like to leave it as a future work that the 
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principal uses the combination of payoff scheme and message space to 




Suppose there are two states of the world: good state ω1 and bad state ω2. 
In the good state ω1, if the agent exerts effort, then high output 𝓎 = 1 
happens with probability 1 − ρ and low output 𝓎 = 0 happens with 
probability ρ; In the bad state ω2, if the agent exerts effort, then high output 
𝓎 = 1 happens with probability ρ and low output 𝓎 = 0 happens with 
probability 1 − ρ. Here I assume ρ <
1
2
 and low output is achieved definitely 
if the agent chooses shirk both in good state ω1 or bad state ω2. Suppose at 
the beginning the agent assigns probability μ0 to state ω1 and therefore 
probability 1 − μ0 to state ω2, hence the agent believes that high output 
𝓎 = 1 with probability p0 = μ0(1 − ρ) + (1 − μ0)ρ and low output 𝓎 = 0 
with probability 1 − p0 = μ0ρ + (1 − μ0)(1 − ρ). 
 
Suppose at date t, the agent’s belief of high output if exerting effort is 𝑝𝑡 and 
then his belief of the state being good one is 𝜇𝑡 =
𝑝𝑡−𝜌
1−2𝜌
. And his belief at date 
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t + 1 of state being good following high output at date t should be as follows, 
𝜇𝑡+1
𝐻 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝜔1|𝑦𝑡 = 1, 𝑦
𝑡} =










(1 − 𝜌)(𝑝𝑡 − 𝜌)
𝑝𝑡(1 − 2𝜌)
2 
and therefore the agent belief of high output if exerting effort at date t + 1 
should be 𝑝𝑡+1
𝐻 = 1 −
𝜌(1−𝜌)
𝑝𝑡
. Similarly, I have the agent’s belief of high 












𝑝0 = 𝑝0 = 𝜇0(1 − ρ) + (1 − 𝜇0)ρ
𝑝𝑘 = 1 −
𝑀
𝑝𝑘−1




   ∀𝑘 < 0
𝑀 = 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)
, 
where k represents the net number of high output along the sequence of 
output. 
 
Define output space at time t as 𝑌𝑡 = {0,1} and output space up to time t as 
𝑌𝑡 =×𝑖=0
𝑡−1 𝑌𝑖. A contract is a function that specifies stipulated action 𝑎𝑡: 𝑌
𝑡 →
{𝑊, 𝑆}3, fixed wage 𝑤𝑡: 𝑌
𝑡 → 𝑅 and bonus 𝑏𝑡: 𝑌
𝑡 → 𝑅. Here fixed wage refers 
to the utility transfer regardless of outcome within that period while bonus 
refers to the additional utility transfer contingent on the outcome within that 
                                                     
2 yt =×𝑙=0
𝑡−1 (𝑦𝑙) summarizes history of output string prior time t. 
3 Here W represents action work and S means action shirk. 
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period being 1. Limited liability assumes that both 𝑤𝑡 and 𝑏𝑡 should be 
weakly larger than 0.  
 
I consider stationary Markov contract defined in Hu (2013) where contract 
terms function is determined completely by the posterior belief and 
therefore by the net number of high output along the sequence of output, 
which is now defined as state. 
 
There are two critical assumptions in the paper. At first only one-step 
deviation is allowed and any further step deviation is excluded in the paper in 
order to avoid complexity, we could assume that if the agent deviates twice, 
then his misdeeds will be revealed to the principal. Or we can also assume 
that there are two states of the world, i.e. good state and bad state and the 
original state is good one. At good state the agent could choose shirk or 
work. At bad state the agent could only choose work. If the agent chooses 
shirk at good state, then the state will be transited to bad one4. Secondly I 
assume it is always optimal for the principal to incentivize the agent to exert 





                                                     
4 Similar method can be found in Zhu (2015), where state transition is used to eliminate time 
persistence and therefore one-shot deviation principle could be adopted. 
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2.2 Two-Stage Model 
 
From this section on, I will replace pk with pk to simplify denotation. I at first 
consider a two stage model. In stage 1, given the initial agent’s belief 𝑝0, 
which is shared by the principal, if the agent chooses to exert effort, then 
high outcome will be achieved with probability 𝑝0. Therefore, along the 
equilibrium path, if high outcome is achieved in the first stage, then the 
agent’s belief 𝑝0 will be updated to 𝑝1 at the beginning of stage 2 and IC at 
this stage can be written as 𝑝1𝑏1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0. If on the other hand, along the 
equilibrium path, low outcome is achieved in the first stage, then the agent’s 
belief 𝑝0 will be updated to 𝑝−1 at the beginning of stage 2 and therefore the 
IC at the second stage can be written as 𝑝−1𝑏−1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0. In the first stage, 
the payoff of the agent if exerting effort is (1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 + 𝑝0{(1 − 𝛿)𝑏0 +
𝛿[𝑝1𝑏1 + 𝑤1 − 𝑐]} + (1 − 𝑝0)𝛿(𝑝−1𝑏−1 + 𝑤−1 − 𝑐) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑐, while the 
payoff of the agent if shirking is (1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 + 𝛿(𝑝0𝑏−1 + 𝑤−1 − 𝑐) (since I 
assume that the agent will be incentivized to exert effort in state 𝑝−1, it’s also 
better for the agent to exert effort given his belief 𝑝0). 
 
The problem can be written as follows  
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑏𝑖,𝑤𝑖|𝑖=−1,0,1}(1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 + 𝑝0{(1 − 𝛿)𝑏0 + 𝛿[𝑝1𝑏1 + 𝑤1 − 𝑐]}
+ (1 − 𝑝0)𝛿(𝑝−1𝑏−1 + 𝑤−1 − 𝑐) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 
𝑠. 𝑡. (1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 + 𝑝0{(1 − 𝛿)𝑏0 + 𝛿[𝑝1𝑏1 + 𝑤1 − 𝑐]} + (1 − 𝑝0)𝛿(𝑝−1𝑏−1 +
𝑤−1 − 𝑐) − (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 + 𝛿(𝑝0𝑏−1 + 𝑤−1 − 𝑐); 
𝑝1𝑏1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0; 
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𝑝−1𝑏−1 − 𝑐 ≥ 0; 
𝑏𝑖, 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 for 𝑖 = −1,0,1. 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal contract in the two stage model should be 𝑤0 =
𝑤−1 = 0, 𝑏−1 =
𝑐
𝑝−1
 and (𝑤1, 𝑏0, 𝑏1) satisfies the following linear equation 




PROOF: Construct Lagrangian function 𝐿 = −(1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 − 𝑝0{(1 − 𝛿)𝑏0 +
𝛿[𝑝1𝑏1 + 𝑤1 − 𝑐]} − (1 − 𝑝0)𝛿(𝑝−1𝑏−1 + 𝑤−1 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 +
𝜆{𝑝0[(1 − 𝛿)𝑏0 + 𝛿(𝑝1𝑏1 + 𝑤1 − 𝑐)] + (1 − 𝑝0)𝛿(𝑝−1𝑏−1 + 𝑤−1 − 𝑐) −









 as 0, I can derive that 𝜃0 = (1 − 𝛿), 𝜃1 = 0, 𝜃−1 = 𝛿, 
𝛾 = 0, 𝛼 =
𝑝0
𝑝−1
𝛿, 𝛽 = 0 and 𝜆 = 1. With Lagrange theorem, I have 𝑤0 =
𝑤−1 = 0, 𝑏−1 =
𝑐
𝑝−1
 and 𝑝0(1 − 𝛿)𝑏0 + 𝛿𝑝0(𝑝1𝑏1 − 𝑐) + 𝛿𝑝0𝑤1 =





There are several observations that deserve to be mentioned from this 
proposition. At first time persistent effort is able to alter payoff distributions 
in the future and therefore high incentive at some period is able to not only 
incentivize the agent to exert effort at that period but also incentivize him to 
do so at prior periods. That is to say higher bonus at state +1 (𝑝1𝑏1 − 𝑐 > 0) 
induces the agent to exert effort at state +1, at the same time it also makes 
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up some of incentive at state 0 to induce the agent’s effort at state 0. And 
such net incentive at state +1, which equals to 𝑝1𝑏1 − 𝑐, can be replaced by 
fixed wage 𝑤1 at state +1. I name 𝛿𝑝0(𝑝1𝑏1 − 𝑐) + 𝛿𝑝0𝑤1 as cross-state 
incentive. Such back-loading bonus can be found in Zhu (2015), which 
assumes that myopic action will have time persistent effect in jeopardising 
outcome in the next period. In that paper back-loading bonus and cliff-like 
bonus scheme are able to avoid agent’s choice of myopic action. Besides 
back-loading bonus is also adopted in Hu (2015) which assumes that 
competent type agent’s effort is time persistent in terms of increasing the 
principal’s belief of the agent’s being competent. Back-loading bonus will 
help the principal not only enhance incentive in incentivizing the inept agent 
but also create cross-state incentive in incentivizing competent agent to exert 
effort in prior periods. 
 
Secondly shirking at stage 0 will lead to not only lower outcome definitely at 
current stage but also belief discrepancy between the agent and the principal 
in next stage. And since it is harder for the principal to incentivize the agent 
to exert effort at state −1, or put it in another way, the principal needs to 
impose higher bonus to induce agent to exert effort at state −1, such belief-
discrepancy may be utilized by the agent deliberately so as to gain higher 




𝑐 as belief-discrepancy gain.  
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stated in Proposition 1 can then be interpreted as belief-discrepancy gain 
equals to the agent’s expected payoff at the optimum.  
 
There are two major differences between my paper and the existing 
literatures. The first difference lies in the time persistence of the agent’s 
effort and therefore history dependent payment scheme can be applied to 
create cross state incentive to induce the agent to work in previous periods. 
And that’s where back-loading incentive and superior state fixed wage plays a 
role and hence my model witnesses an equivalence among front loading 
incentive, back-loading incentive and superior state fixed wage, which is 
missing in the existing literatures. Secondly, in the previous literature, the 
amount of incentive to be adopted is to make the agent indifferent between 
working or shirking and therefore the agent’s expected payoff should always 
be zero; while in my model, the agent’s deviation from the equilibrium action 
will create potential belief-discrepancy, which is a private knowledge to the 
agent. And the agent could possible make use of this private knowledge to 
achieve positive gain. Such positive gain should be taken into consideration in 






2.3 Infinite Stage Model with Extremal States 
 
Consider a small extension of the basic model, there are five states of the 
game, i.e. +2,+1, 0, −1,−2, where +2 and −2 are absorbing states, at 
which the principal will cease to incentivize the agent to exert effort and 
therefore the state will always keep there once it reaches +2 and −2 or once 
there are two net high outputs or low outputs. 
 
This model can be related to the scenarios where the agent can be self-
motivated in superior states while it is too costly to incentivize agent in 
inferior state. Specifically, in superior state, where the agent is confident 
enough toward the imperfect monitoring device, the cost of incentivising the 
agent to exert effort can diminishes to zero. On the other hand, in inferior 
state, where the agent lacks confidence toward the imperfect monitoring 
device excessively, the cost to incentivize the agent to exert effort can be 
overwhelming and the cross-state payment is quite slight due to the discount 
factor and the dis-confidence of being updated to superior state from 
excessively inferior state.  
 
IC constraints at each state can be written as follows, 
At state −1, 𝐼𝐶−1: (1 − 𝛿)𝑝−1𝑏−1 + 𝛿𝑝−1𝑉0 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐; 
At state 0, 𝐼𝐶0: (1 − 𝛿)𝑝0𝑏0 + 𝛿𝑝0𝑉1 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑝0)𝑉−1 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 + 𝛿𝑉−1
0 ; 




𝑖 represents the payoff of the agent where the principal takes the 
current state as j while the agent regards the current state as i. 
 
Since only one-step deviation is considered in our problem, 𝑉−1
0 =
−(1 − 𝛿)𝑐 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑤−1 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑝0𝑏−1 + 𝛿𝑝0𝑉0
1, 𝑉0
1 = −(1 − 𝛿)𝑐 +
(1 − 𝛿)𝑤0 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑝1𝑏0 + 𝛿𝑝1𝑉1
2 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑝1)𝑉−1
0 . 
 
Now define incentive level at state 𝑖 as 𝛥𝑖: = (1 − 𝛿)𝑏𝑖 + 𝛿(𝑉𝑖+1 − 𝑉𝑖−1) and 
discrepancy gain at state 𝑖 as ∆𝑉𝑖−1 = 𝑉𝑖−1
𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖−1. And therefore IC 
constraint at state 𝑖  can be written as 𝑝𝑖∆𝑖≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 + 𝛿∆𝑉𝑖−1. I can also 
derive the recursive function as follows 
{
∆𝑖=
∆𝑉𝑖 − 𝛿𝑝𝑖+1∆𝑉𝑖+1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝑝𝑖+1)∆𝑉𝑖−1
𝑝𝑖+1 − 𝑝𝑖
∆𝑉2 = ∆𝑉−2 = 0
, 
 
The problem can be written as follows, 
min𝑉0 
s.t. 𝑝−1𝛥−1 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐; 
𝑝0𝛥0 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 + 𝛿∆𝑉−1; 












 and 𝑝𝑖+1 − 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1 − 2√𝑀. 














Since 𝑝𝑖−1(1 − 𝑝𝑖) = 𝑀, I then have pi+1 − 𝑝𝑖 = 1 −
𝑀
𝑝𝑖
− 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1 − 2√𝑀 





Lemma 2: In the optimal contract, 𝑤𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 = 1,0, −1. 
PROOF: I would like to show that through decreasing 𝑤𝑖 and increasing both 
𝑏0 and 𝑏1,  same 𝑉0 can be realized while IC constraints will be relaxed.  
 
Take 𝑤−1 for instance. Suppose (1 − 𝛿)𝑤−1 is lowered by 𝛥, (1 − 𝛿)𝑝0𝑏0 is 
increased by 𝑥 and (1 − 𝛿)𝑝1𝑏1 is increased by 𝑦. I will show that there is a 
pair of positive (𝑥, 𝑦) such that 𝑉0 is kept fixed and IC constraints will be 
relaxed.  
 
To keep 𝑉0 fixed, we have 𝛥 =
𝑥+𝛿𝑝0𝑦
𝛿(1−𝑝0)
. And since 𝑉0 is the same, 𝐼𝐶−1 is kept 
the same. 𝐼𝐶0 can be rewritten as 𝑉0 ≥ 𝛿𝑉−1
0 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑤0. To study 𝐼𝐶0, I 
only need to study 𝛥𝑉−1
























> 0 ⟺ 1 > 𝛿2(𝑀 + 𝑝1(1 − 𝑝0)). Introduce 𝑀 = 𝑝0(1 − 𝑝1) into the 
left-hand side of the inequality, I only need to show that 1 ≥ 𝑝0 + 𝑝1 −
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2𝑝0𝑝1 or 1 ≥ 2𝑝0(1 − 𝑝1) + 𝑝1 − 𝑝0 = 2𝑀 + 𝑝1 − 𝑝0. Using Lemma 1, I 
have such inequality. Therefore, if I set 𝑥 large enough, I am able to relax the 
𝐼𝐶0. To relax 𝐼𝐶1, I need to set 𝑦 {1 −
𝛿
1−2𝛿2𝑀












] 𝑥 > 0. I need to show 1 −
𝛿
1−2𝛿2𝑀















, I then need to show that 1 >
𝛿2(2𝑀 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝−1). By Lemma 1, I have 2𝑀 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝−1 < 1. Therefore, if I 
set 𝑦 large enough, I am able to relax the 𝐼𝐶1. Accordingly, I can find a 
positive pair of (𝑥, 𝑦) that not only keeps 𝑉0 fixed but also relaxes IC 
constraints. Or put it in other words, I have dominance of 𝑏0 and 𝑏1 over 
𝑤−1. Similarly, I can also show the dominance of 𝑏0 and 𝑏1 over 𝑤0 and over 
𝑤−1. 
 
Lemma 2 says that in this model, bonus will weakly dominate5 the fixed 
wage, regardless of the discount factor 𝛿, constant M (or ρ(1 − ρ)) and initial 
belief 𝑝0. In models where belief discrepancy is absent, such as Zhu (2015) 
and Hu (2015), such dominancy is easy to be gained since the bonus not only 
plays the role of intertemporal incentive as fixed wage, but also provides 
extra incentives within a period. Whereas in my model such dominancy is 
weakened where bonus will also lead to extra belief-discrepancy gain, which 
deteriorates the incentive for the agent to exert effort within that period. 
However, Bayesian belief updating rule, together with the exclusion of more 
                                                     
5 Though the adoption of bonus, in comparison of fixed wage, will lead to constraints’ strictly relaxed, 
strict relaxation of constraints may not necessarily contribute to strict increase in objective function.  
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than one step deviation, limit the belief-discrepancy range and therefore the 
belief-discrepancy gain. And hence such dominancy still holds in our model 
where belief discrepancy arises.  
 
Hence the problem above can be written as the following form  
min 𝑝0∆0 + 𝛿𝑝−1∆−1 
s.t.  𝑝−1𝛥−1 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐; 
𝑝0𝛥0 ≥ (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 + 𝛿∆𝑉−1; 








Proposition 2: In the optimal contract, IC holds at optimum.  
PROOF:  
At first I construct the Lagrangian. 
From the recursive function, I then can use ∆𝑖 to represent ∆𝑉𝑖 for 𝑖 =






𝛿𝑝0(𝑝1 − 𝑝0)∆0 + (1 − 𝛿









𝛿(1 − 𝑝2)(𝑝1 − 𝑝0)∆0 + 𝛿





I then introduce ∆𝑉𝑖 into the IC, and by constructing Lagrangian and obtaining 





















(1 − 𝛿2𝐾)(𝑝0 − 𝑝−1)
1 − 2𝛿2𝑀
+ 𝛽





From the first equation, I have 𝛽 =
𝛿3𝑝0(𝑝2−𝑝1)𝛼
1−2𝛿2𝑀−𝛿2(𝑝2−𝑝1)
, and then I introduce it 
into the second equation. By Lemma 1, I can show that 𝛼 > 0. Therefore 𝛽 >
0 and 𝜆 > 0. 
 
To understand Proposition 2, I would like to derive the explicit form of 𝑉𝑖 and 
𝑉𝑖























































1 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑝1)𝑇−1}.
, 
where 𝑇𝑖 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑝𝑖𝑏𝑖 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑤𝑖 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑐 and 𝑇𝑖
𝑖+1 = (1 −
𝛿)𝑝𝑖+1𝑏𝑖 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑤𝑖 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑐.  
 
I at first check 𝐼𝐶−1. Since our objective is to minimize 𝑉0, therefore 𝛿𝑝−1𝑉0 
can not provide enough intertemporal incentive and 𝑏−1 is then used to 
balance the remaining incentive. However, 𝑏−1 can not be set too high as it 
also makes contribution to belief-discrepancy gain, especially ∆𝑉−1, which 
will deteriorate incentives in state 0. Hence 𝐼𝐶−1 holds. Then I check 𝐼𝐶0. As 
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in the two-stage model, I still face the comparison between 𝑏0 and 𝛿𝑝1𝑏1. 
However, unlike the two-stage model, in which equivalence between 𝑏0 and 
𝛿𝑝1𝑏1 holds, 𝑏0 dominates 𝛿𝑝1𝑏1 when 𝑏0 is small in this model due to the 
time persistence effect of belief distortion. Suppose the agent shirks at state 
0, then belief distortion arises where the agent is more confident on future 
outcomes and rational expectation of belief updating means that the agent is 
also more confident on the way he updates his belief. All these factors lead 
to the fact that 𝑉−1
0  puts relatively more weight on 𝛿𝑝1𝑏1 than 𝑉
0 does and 
hence 𝑏0 dominates 𝛿𝑝1𝑏1 for small 𝑏0. For the same reason 𝑏0 can not be 
too high since it deteriorates the incentive, especially in state +1. All in all, 
such zig-zag property and time-persistence effect of belief distortion lead to 
the holding of IC. 
 
2.4 Time Persistent Moral Hazard Model Without Extremal 
States 
 
We now consider an infinite stage and infinite state model and assume it is 
always optimal for the principal to incentivize the agent to exert effort at 












I am going to use the recursive method to deal with this problem. At first I 
guess the minimum payoff for the agent to incentivize him to exert effort at 
each stage given the initial state 𝑖  and belief discrepancy gain at state 𝑖 + 1 
and state 𝑖 + 2 as 𝐶(∆𝑉𝑖, ∆𝑉𝑖+1, 𝑝𝑖+1). I then have the recursive formula  
𝐶(∆𝑉𝑖, ∆𝑉𝑖+1, 𝑝𝑖+1) = 𝛿𝐶(∆𝑉𝑖−1, ∆𝑉𝑖, 𝑝𝑖) + 𝑝𝑖∆𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑐. 
 
Then I exclude the possibility of fixed wage and only bonus is allowed in this 
model. Actually if I am dealing with the issue where both the agent and the 
principal are not quite patient, the role of fixed wage in providing 
intertemporal incentive diminishes and therefore the dominance of bonus 
over fixed wage holds.  
 
I then introduce the equation of ∆𝑖 into the recursive formula above and I 
then have  




(1 − 𝛿)𝑐. The right part is a decreasing function of ∆𝑉𝑖−1, which I will verify it 
later. 
 
Next I introduce the 𝐼𝐶𝑖 constraint into the recursive formula and I also guess 
that 𝐶(∆𝑉𝑖, ∆𝑉𝑖+1, 𝑝𝑖+1) = 𝑐1(𝑝𝑖+1)∆𝑉𝑖 + 𝑐2(𝑝𝑖+1)∆𝑉𝑖+1 + 𝑐3(𝑝𝑖+1) where 
𝑐1(𝑝𝑖+1) < 0. I then have the following equation  
𝑐1(𝑝𝑖+1)∆𝑉𝑖 + 𝑐2(𝑝𝑖+1)∆𝑉𝑖+1 + 𝑐3(𝑝𝑖+1) 
= 𝛿(𝑐1(𝑝𝑖) + 1)
𝑝𝑖∆𝑉𝑖−𝛿𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑖+1∆𝑉𝑖+1−(𝑝𝑖+1−𝑝𝑖)(1−𝛿)𝑐
𝛿𝑝𝑖+1(1−𝑝𝑖)
+ 𝛿𝑐2(𝑝𝑖)∆𝑉𝑖 + 𝛿𝑐3(𝑝𝑖). 
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𝑐3(𝑝𝑖+1) = 𝛿𝑐3(𝑝𝑖) −

























Based the above analysis, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1: In the optimal contract, 
 all the IC constraints bind; 





 the value function can be written in the following recursive formula 






− 𝛿2) ∆𝑉𝑖 +
𝛿
1−𝛿2
∆𝑉𝑖+1 + 𝑐3(𝑝𝑖+1), 











I have the following two discrete dynamic systems 𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝐹(𝑋𝑡, 𝑡) and 
𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝐻(𝑋𝑡, 𝑡). As for the first discrete dynamic system 𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝐹(𝑋𝑡, 𝑡), 







 with initial state (𝑥0, 𝑦0) =
(∆𝑉0, ∆𝑉1). As for the second discrete dynamic system 𝑋𝑡+1 = 𝐻(𝑋𝑡, 𝑡), 






 with initial state (𝑥0, 𝑦0) =
(∆𝑉1, ∆𝑉0).  The first dynamic system F has the fixed point (+∞,+∞), 






(1 − 𝛿)𝑐), which 
converges to (0,0) for 𝑡 → ∞ by Lemma 1. The same applies to the second 
dynamic system H.  
 
As for the future work, I would like to derive the conditions on the model so 
that there is a closed set on the initial point (∆𝑉0, ∆𝑉1), in which the path 
specified in dynamic systems H and F converges to 0. Finally, I am trying to 












In this paper I am trying to deal with the case where there is an outcome-
related uncertainty and the agent updates his belief in each round if he 
exerts effort. I assume that the belief-updating rule accords to the Bayesian 
rule, which is mutual knowledge between the principal and the agent. The 
principal can only make an inference on the agent’s belief based on the initial 
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belief and the outcome in each round. Hence belief-discrepancy gain should 
be taken into account when the moral hazard issue exists. 
 
At first I study the two-stage model and I have derived the explicit form of 
the optimal contract, in which there is an equivalence between back-loading 
bonus and front-loading bonus and extra incentive is to create the cross-state 
incentive.  
 
Secondly I investigate the infinite-stage model with five states, two of which 
play the roles of extremal states. For one thing I have shown the dominance 
of bonus over wage, regardless of the discount factor, constant M and initial 
belief. This is due to the fact that even though bonus will increase the belief-
discrepancy gain, which deteriorates incentive in each round, such gain will 
be limited due to the assumed Bayesian belief updating rule and will be 
strictly dominated by its advantage in creating incentive. For another I also 
prove that the IC will be binding in the optimum. This is because of the zig-
zag property and time-persistence of belief-distortion effect. 
 
Finally, I study the infinite-stage model without extremal states. I have shown 
that at optimum IC binds at each state and I have also derived the explicit 
functional form of the minimum cost function. I have shown a way to solve 
this problem explicitly, which will be left for future work. 
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As for future work I would like to consider dynamic mechanism design with 
reputation concerns where the principal tries to use the recording 
(commenting) probability to incentivize the agent to act in the way favoured 
by the principal. Also I would like to extend Ely (2015)’s analysis by 
introducing monetary payment in the mechanism design device and try to 
balance communication (mixing signals at optimum) with monetary payment 
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